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Abstract
A two-country sticky-price general equilibrium model is used to examine
the implications of the expenditure switching eﬀect for the welfare properties
of ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchange rate regimes. A comparison between the two
regimes shows that the volatility of consumption is unambiguously lower in the
ﬂoating exchange rate regime, but the volatility of home output can be higher
or lower depending on the value of the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods. A utility-based welfare comparison of the two regimes
concludes that a ﬂoating exchange rate regime yields higher welfare when
the expenditure switching eﬀect is relatively weak, but a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime is superior when the expenditure switching eﬀect is strong.
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This paper analyses the macroeconomic implications of ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchange
rate regimes and presents a welfare comparison of the two regimes in the presence of
stochastic foreign monetary shocks. The main focus of analysis is the role played by
the expenditure switching eﬀect of exchange rate changes in the choice of exchange
rate regime.
Early proponents of ﬂoating exchange rates, such as Friedman (1953), argued
that ﬂoating exchange rates are desirable because they provide a degree of insula-
tion against foreign shocks. A ﬂoating rate regime allows a country to set monetary
policy independently from monetary policy in other countries. This prevents the
transmission of foreign monetary policy shocks to the domestic economy. Further-
more, when goods prices are sticky, a ﬂoating rate regime allows relative prices to
adjust in response to country speciﬁc real demand and supply shocks. Thus, it was
argued, ﬂoating exchange rates act as a ‘shock absorber’ which helps stabilise the
domestic economy in the face of both monetary and real shocks.
Recently there has been a growing literature on the choice of exchange rate
regimes based on welfare comparisons in general equilibrium models with sticky-
prices. This new literature has allowed a re-examination of the shock-absorber role
of the exchange rate. A particularly important issue that has emerged in the recent
literature (see Devereux and Engel (1998, 2000), Devereux (2000) and Bachetta and
van Wincoop (2000)) is the distinction between ‘producer currency pricing’ (where
prices are ﬁxed in the currency of the producer) and ‘local currency pricing’ (where
prices are ﬁxed in the currency of the consumer). One implication of local currency
pricing is that the expenditure switching eﬀect of exchange rate changes is much
reduced (or even eliminated). This tends to reduce the ability of the exchange rate
to act as a shock absorber in response to real demand and supply shocks and thus
alters the welfare case for ﬂoating exchange rates.
The present paper also considers the implications of the expenditure switching
eﬀect for the choice of exchange rate regime, but here the important issue is the
degree of substitutability between home and foreign goods (rather than the currency
in which prices are set). Recent papers have focused on models where the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods is restricted to unity. They therefore
implicitly restrict the strength of the expenditure switching eﬀect. This issue is not
relevant in the case of local currency pricing (because relative prices do not change)
but it can be important in the case of producer currency pricing (as the results
presented in this paper show).
The paper uses a two-country sticky price general equilibrium model (where
prices are ﬁxed in the currency of the producer) to compare the welfare properties
of exchange rate regimes. The foreign country is subject to stochastic money supply
shocks and the focus of interest is on the stabilisation and welfare implications of
regime choice for the home country. A comparison between the two exchange rate
regimes shows that, while the volatility of consumption is unambiguously lower in
the ﬂoating exchange rate regime, the volatility of home output is only lower in the
1ﬂoating rate regime when the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods is low. Thus the ability of ﬂoating rates to insulate the home country from
foreign monetary shocks depends on the strength of the expenditure switching eﬀect.
A ﬂoating rate regime allows the home economy to set its money supply indepen-
dently and thus foreign money shocks are not transmitted to the home economy via
home monetary policy. But a ﬂoating rate regime implies that foreign monetary
shocks cause movements in the exchange rate which, in turn, aﬀect home output
through the expenditure switching eﬀect. The strength of the expenditure switching
eﬀect therefore determines the relative stabilising properties of the two regimes.
The strength of the expenditure switching eﬀect is also found to be important
for determining the relative welfare performance of the two regimes. A ﬂoating
exchange rate regime yields higher welfare when the expenditure switching eﬀect is
relatively weak, but a ﬁxed exchange rate regime is superior when the expenditure
switching eﬀect is strong.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model; Section 3 describes
the solution method and approximation of the model; Section 4 derives expressions
for consumption and output in ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchange rate regimes and com-
pares their volatilities under the two regimes; Section 5 presents the derivation of
the welfare measure and a welfare comparison of diﬀerent exchange rate regimes;
and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2T h e M o d e l
The model is a variation of the sticky-price general equilibrium structure which
has become standard in the recent open economy macro literature (following the
approach developed by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995, 1998)).1 The main point at which
the model diﬀers from many others in the recent literature is that the elasticity of
substitution between home and foreign goods can diﬀer from unity. The only source
of stochastic shocks in the model is the foreign money supply. Two possible regimes
for the home monetary authority are considered. In a ﬁxed exchange rate regime
the home money supply is used to achieve the desired target exchange rate. In a
ﬂoating exchange rate regime the home money supply is ﬁxed.2
2.1 Market Structure
The world exists for a single period and consists of two countries, which will be
referred to as the home country and the foreign country. There is a continuum
1See Lane (2001) for a recent survey of this literature.
2This is, of course, only one form of ﬂoating rate regime. There are many other options for the
home monetary authority in a ﬂoating rate regime. In particular the home monetary authority
could adopt a monetary rule which maximises home welfare. The ﬁxed money assumption adopted
here is, however, a natural benchmark which corresponds to the Friedman policy prescription (and
also to the analysis of Devereux and Engel (1998)).
2of agents of unit mass in each country with home agents indexed h ∈ [0,1] and
foreign agents indexed f ∈ [0,1]. Agents consume a basket of goods containing all
home and foreign produced goods. Each agent is a monopoly producer of a single
diﬀerentiated product. All agents set prices in advance of the realisation of shocks
and are contracted to meet demand at the pre-ﬁxed prices. Prices are set in the
currency of the producer.
The detailed structure of the home country is described below. The foreign
country has an identical structure. Where appropriate, foreign real variables and
foreign currency prices are indicated with an asterisk.
2.2 Preferences
All agents in the home economy have utility functions of the same form. The utility













where χ and K are positive constants, C is a consumption index deﬁned across all
home and foreign goods, M denotes end-of-period nominal money holdings, P is
the consumer price index, y(h) is the output of good h and E is the expectations
operator.









































where φ>1,c H (i) is consumption of home good i and cF (j) is consumption of
foreign good j.T h e p a r a m e t e r θ is the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods. This is the key parameter which determines the strength of the
expenditure switching eﬀect.
The budget constraint of agent h is given by
M(h)=M0 + pH (h)y(h) − PC(h) − T + PR(h) (4)
where M0 and M(h) are initial and ﬁnal money holdings, T is a lump-sum gov-
ernment transfer, pH (h) is the price of home good h, P is the aggregate consumer
price index and R(h) is the income from a portfolio of state contingent assets (to be
described in more detail below).
3The government’s budget constraint is
M − M0 + T =0 (5)
Changes in the money supply are assumed to enter and leave the economy via
changes in lump-sum transfers.
2.3 Price Indices

































The law of one price is assumed to hold. This implies pH (i)=p∗
H (i)S and
pF (j)=p∗
F (j)S for all i and j where an asterisk indicates a price measured in
foreign currency and S is the exchange rate (deﬁned as the domestic price of for-
eign currency). Purchasing power parity holds in terms of aggregate consumer price
indices, P = P∗S.
2.4 Consumption Choices































Foreign demands for home and foreign goods have an identical structure to the home
demands. Individual foreign demand for representative home good, h,a n df o r e i g n


















































Each country has a population of unit mass so the total demands for goods are
equivalent to individual demands. The total demand for home goods is therefore
Y = CH + C∗
H a n dt h et o t a ld e m a n df o rf o r e i g ng o o d si sY ∗ = CF + C∗
F.
42.5 Optimal Price Setting
The ﬁrst-order condition for price setting for home agents is derived in Appendix A
















2.6 Financial Markets and Risk Sharing
The asymmetric structure of shocks and monetary policy, coupled with a non-unit
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, makes it necessary to
adopt a more explicit structure for international asset markets than is usual in the
recent literature.3 It is assumed that suﬃcient contingent ﬁnancial instruments exist
to allow eﬃcient sharing of consumption risks. All consumption is ﬁnanced out of
real income so the only source of consumption risk is variability in real income.
Eﬃcient sharing of consumption risk can therefore be achieved by allowing trade in
two state-contingent assets, one which has a payoﬀ correlated with home aggregate
real income and one with a payoﬀ correlated with foreign real income. For simplicity
it is assumed that each asset pays a return equal to the relevant country’s real
income, i.e. a unit of the home asset pays y = YP H/P and a unit of the foreign
asset pays y∗ = Y ∗PF/P.4 The portfolio pay-oﬀs for home and foreign agents are
given by the following
R(h)=ζH (h)(y − qH)+ζF (h)(y




H (f)(y − qH)+ζ
∗
F (f)(y
∗ − qF) (15)
where ζH (h) and ζF (h) are holdings of home agent h of the home and foreign assets,
ζ
∗
H (f) and ζ
∗
F (f) are the holdings of foreign agent f of home and foreign assets and
qH and qF are the unit prices of the home and foreign assets.
It is important to specify the timing of asset trade. It is assumed that asset
t r a d et a k e sp l a c ea f t e rt h ec h o i c eo fe x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e .T h i si m p l i e st h a ta g e n t s
3When θ is equal to unity the trade balance between the two countries automatically balances
in all states of the world, in which case ﬁnancial markets are irrelevant. When θ 6=1it becomes
necessary to consider the structure of ﬁnancial markets. Additionally, when shocks are asymmetric
and when the focus of interest is the policy choice and welfare of a single country, it becomes
necessary explicitly to consider how policy choices aﬀect asset prices and portfolio decisions.
4Note that asset pay-oﬀs are correlated with aggregate income. Individual agents therefore treat
pay-oﬀs as exogenous. This implies that the existence of contingent assets has no direct impact on
optimal price setting.
5can insure themselves against the risk implied by a particular exchange rate regime
but they can not insure themselves against the choice of regime.5
Appendix B shows that risk sharing implies the following relationship between
















2.7 Money Demand and Supply




The money supply in each country is assumed to be determined by the relevant
national monetary authority. The foreign money supply is subject to stochastic
shocks such that logM∗ is symmetrically distributed over the interval [− , ] with
E[logM∗]=0and Va r[logM∗]=σ2. In the case of a ﬂoating exchange rate the
home monetary authority is assumed to keep the home money supply constant at
¯ M. In the case of a ﬁxed exchange rate the home monetary authority is assumed
to use the home money supply to maintain the exchange rate at the target level, ¯ S.
For simplicity ¯ M = ¯ S =1 .
3 Model Approximation
It is not possible to derive an exact solution to the model described above.6 The
model is therefore approximated around a non-stochastic equilibrium.
Before proceeding it is necessary to deﬁne and explain some notation. The non-
stochastic equilibrium of the model is deﬁned as the solution which results when




where ¯ X is
the value of variable X in the non-stochastic equilibrium. ˆ X is therefore the log-
deviation of X from its value in the non-stochastic equilibrium.
The only exogenous forcing variable in the model is the foreign money supply,
M∗, so all log-deviations from the non-stochastic equilibrium are of the same order as
5If, alternatively, asset trade takes place before the exchange rate regime is chosen, it would
be possible for agents to insure themselves against the choice of regime. This could have very
signiﬁcant implications for the optimal choice of regime. The home monetary authority would be
tempted to choose a regime which implies high volatility of demand for home goods. The high
volatility of demand would discourage home labour supply and reduce home work eﬀort but the
level of home consumption would be protected by the risk-sharing arrangement. This alternative
risk-sharing structure raises some interesting issues but it also involves some technical problems
which go beyond the scope of this paper.
6The complication arising in this model is contained in equation (6). When θ is diﬀerent from
unity this equation is not linear in logs.
6t h es h o c k st o ˆ M∗, which (by assumption) are of maximum size  . When presenting
an equation which is approximated up to order n it is therefore possible to gather
all terms of order higher than n in a single term denoted O( n+1). Thus, when
the term O( 2) appears in an equation the variables in that equation should be
understood to be accurate up to order one. While an equation which includes the
term O( 3) should be understood to contain variables which are accurate up to order
two. And an equation which does not include any term of the form O( n) should
be understood to hold exactly.
The analysis of the model proceeds in two stages. The ﬁrst stage considers the
implications of ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchange rates for the volatilities of macro vari-
ables. The second stage considers a welfare comparison between ﬁxed and ﬂoating
exchange rates.
Variances are, by deﬁnition, at least of second order so an analysis of volatilities
requires the derivation of at least second—order accurate solutions for variances.
But second-order accurate solutions for variances can be obtained from ﬁrst-order
accurate solutions for the relationships between endogenous variables and the shock
variable. The analysis of volatility therefore involves working with a log-linearised
(i.e. ﬁrst-order approximated) version of the model.
The expressions for second moments obtained in the analysis of volatility also
enter into the analysis of welfare. But a full second-order expression for welfare
requires second-order accurate solutions for both the ﬁrst and second moments of
variables. So a full analysis of welfare involves working with a second-order approx-
imation of the model.
4 Macroeconomic Volatility
A ﬁrst-order expansion of equation (16) shows that risk sharing implies the following
relationship between consumption levels in the two countries





where, as explained above, the term O( 2) indicates that the variables in this
relationship should be understood to be accurate up to a ﬁrst-order approxima-
tion. When combined with the purchasing power parity relationship (which implies
ˆ S = ˆ P − ˆ P∗) and the expressions for home and foreign money demand (which imply
ˆ M = ˆ P + ˆ C and ˆ M∗ = ˆ P∗ + ˆ C∗) the following expression for the exchange rate is
obtained






This expression immediately shows that a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t ei m p l i e st h a tt h eh o m e
money supply is set equal to the foreign money supply, i.e. ˆ M = ˆ M∗, while a ﬂoating
exchange rate implies that ˆ S = − ˆ M∗ + O( 2).
The assumption of ﬁx e dg o o d sp r i c e si m p l i e s






















These expressions, combined with the money demand relationships imply that con-
sumption levels are













Thus consumption in the two countries responds equally (because of risk sharing)
to aggregate world monetary policy.































































These expressions reveal the importance of the expenditure switching eﬀect (as
measured by the parameter θ) for determining the impact of monetary policy on
output. If θ is greater than unity monetary policy has a beggar-thy-neighbour eﬀect.
A ne x p a n s i o ni nt h ef o r e i g nm o n e ys u p p l yi ncreases foreign output but reduces home
output (and vice versa for an expansion of the home money supply). The beggar-
thy-neighbour eﬀect arises because of the impact of monetary policy on relative
prices. An expansion of the foreign money supply causes an appreciation of the
nominal exchange rate (see equation (18)) which, for given values of ˆ PH and ˆ P∗
F,
causes a reduction in the relative price of foreign goods. Equations (20) and (21)
show that the change in relative prices has an expenditure switching eﬀect, i.e. there
is a shift of demand from home goods to foreign goods. The size of this expenditure
switching eﬀect depends on the substitutability of home and foreign goods, i.e. it
depends on the value of θ. The negative impact of the exchange rate change on
home output is partly oﬀset by the positive impact of foreign money on total world
consumption (see equation (19)). Thus the beggar-thy-neighbour eﬀect only arises
when θ is greater than unity.
It is now simple to derive expressions for consumption and output levels in ﬁxed
and ﬂoating exchange rate regimes. In a ﬁxed exchange rate regime (i.e. where
ˆ M = ˆ M∗) it follows that consumption levels are given by
ˆ C = ˆ C





and output levels are given by







































In a ﬂoating rate regime (i.e. where ˆ M =0 ) consumption levels are















































































A comparison between the two exchange rate regimes shows that the volatility
of consumption is unambiguously lower in the ﬂoating exchange rate regime but the
volatility of home output can be higher or lower in the ﬂoating exchange rate regime
depending on the value of θ. Equations (23) and (25) show that home output is
less volatile in the ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ew h e nθ>3. Foreign output is more
volatile in the ﬂoating rate regime for θ>1.
The explanation for these eﬀects follows quite easily from consideration of the
above equations. Equation (19) shows that consumption depends on aggregate world
monetary policy. In a ﬂoating exchange rate regime home monetary policy is passive
while a ﬁxed exchange rate regime implies the home monetary authority must repli-
cate foreign monetary developments exactly. World monetary policy must therefore
be less active in the ﬂoating rate regime and hence consumption must be less volatile.
The impact of the exchange rate regime on output volatility can be understood from
equation (22) (which highlights the role of the expenditure switching eﬀect of ex-
change rate changes). The expenditure switching eﬀect becomes more powerful the
higher is the value of θ. This implies that foreign monetary shocks, which are partly
transmitted to the home economy via the expenditure switching eﬀect, have a larger
impact on home output when θ is larger than 3.Aﬁxed exchange rate neutralises
the expenditure switching eﬀect and can therefore stabilise home output when θ>3.
95W e l f a r e
This section compares the welfare implications of ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchange rates.
Following Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998, 2002) it is assumed that the utility of real bal-
ances is small enough to be neglected. It is therefore possible to measure aggregate










As stated above, it is not possible to derive exact analytical solutions to the model.
In order to analyse welfare it is therefore necessary to consider a second-order ap-
proximation of the welfare measure. This is given by
˜ Ω = E
n
ˆ C − K ¯ Y
2
h








where ˜ Ω is the deviation of the level of welfare from the non-stochastic equilibrium.7
Notice that this expression includes the ﬁrst moments of output and consumption
and the second moment of output. Welfare is increasing in the expected level of
consumption and decreasing in the expected level and variance of output. A second-
order accurate expression for the second moment of output has already been derived
in the previous section. But it is now necessary to derive second-order accurate
solutions for the ﬁrst moments of output and consumption. This requires second-
order approximations of the equations of the model.
5.1 Solving for ﬁrst moments
It is useful to start by considering the ﬁrst-order conditions for price setting. Second-
order expansions of (12) and (13) yield
ˆ PH = E
h
ˆ Y + ˆ P + ˆ C
i
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∗ − ˆ P
∗
´2¸
7In the non-stochastic equilibrium individual budget constraints imply that ¯ P ¯ C = ¯ Y ¯ PH.
Combining this expression with equation (12) shows that ¯ Y =[ Kφ/(φ − 1)]
−1/2 , thus K ¯ Y 2 =
(φ − 1)/φ. It will become apparent below that the main welfare results are independent of the
value of ¯ Y.
10Notice that these expressions both include terms (denoted λPH and λP∗
F) which
depend on the second moments of output, consumption and consumer prices. These
terms represent a form of risk premium which is built into goods prices by risk-averse
agents who have to set prices before shocks are realised. The risk premium depends
on the variances and covariances of work eﬀort, the marginal utility of consumption
and the consumer prices.
The expected values of ˆ M and ˆ M∗ are both zero by assumption so it follows
from the money demand relationships that
E
h









(Note that the money demand relationships are linear in logs so they do not require
a n ya p p r o x i m a t i o n . ) T h ee x p r e s s i o n sf o rh o m ea n df o r e i g ng o o d sp r i c e st h e r e f o r e
simplify to




















These expressions can be combined with second-order expansions of the deﬁnitions
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(1 − θ)ˆ S
2
Notice that the non-log-linearity of consumer prices gives rise to another second-
order term (denoted λCPI). This term implies that the expected value of consumer
prices is negatively aﬀected by exchange rate volatility when θ>1. This eﬀect
can be understood by considering the deﬁnition of the consumer price index. The
CPI is concave in the prices of home and foreign goods so any volatility in the
relative price of home and foreign goods (which would result from exchange rate
volatility) will reduce the expected level of aggregate consumer prices. (Another
way to understand this eﬀect is to note that, when home and foreign goods are
substitutable, agents can reduce the average cost of their consumption basket by
switching expenditure towards whichever set of goods are cheapest ex post.R e l a t i v e
price volatility therefore reduces the average price of the consumption basket.)
The expressions for consumer prices can be combined with the money market
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11A second-order expansion of equation (16) shows that risk sharing implies that











































































Combining (31), (32) and (33) with the purchasing power parity condition yields













Using the above equations it is possible to write consumption and output levels
entirely in terms of λPH, λP∗
















































































It is useful at this stage to consider what these expressions reveal about the deter-
mination of the expected levels of consumption and output. Equations (35), (36),
(37) and (38) show that the risk premia, λPH and λP∗
F, have a negative impact
on expected output and consumption. Any factor which increases the risk faced
by producers (such as an increase in the volatility of output) will discourage the
supply of work eﬀort and therefore depress output. By deﬁnition this also reduces
the quantity of goods available for consumption and therefore reduces the expected
level of consumption. Equations (35), (36), (37) and (38) also show that the λCPI
term implies that, when θ>1, exchange rate volatility has a positive impact on
the expected level of consumption and a negative impact on the expected level of
8In general the following equations should include terms which depend on the second moments
of home and foreign consumption. However, the perfect cross-country correlation of consumption
levels implies that these terms are equal to zero. They are therefore omitted from (32) and (33).
12output. As discussed above, exchange rate volatility tends to reduce the average
cost of the consumption basket when θ>1. This allows agents to reduce work eﬀort
and consume more goods.9
The only remaining task is to derive expressions for the second-moment terms
λPH, λP∗
F and λCPI. This can be done simply by using the expressions for realised
output, consumption, prices and the exchange rate derived in Section 4.





so the expressions for the ﬁrst moments of consumption and output in a ﬁxed rate















I nt h ec a s eo faﬂoating rate the following expressions for λPH, λP∗


















so the expressions for the ﬁrst moments of consumption and output in a ﬂoating

































It is now simple to combine the above expressions to obtain the ﬁnal expressions for
welfare. Combining (23) and (39) yields the following expressions for welfare in the
ﬁxed rate regime






9Note that this last point only relates to the eﬀect of exchange rate volatility operating through
the λCPI term. Exchange rate volatility aﬀects λPH, λP ∗
F and λCPI simultaneously, so, in equi-
librium, it will not be possible to increase world consumption and reduce world output simply by
making the exchange rate more volatile.
13and combining (25), (40) and (41) shows that welfare in the ﬂoating rate regime is
given by
˜ ΩFloat = −
µ










It immediately follows from these expressions that the ﬂoating rate regime yields
higher welfare than the ﬁxed rate regime when θ(θ − 3) < 2 or when θ . 3.56.
Thus a ﬂoating exchange rate regime yields higher welfare when the expenditure
switching eﬀect is relatively weak, but a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ei ss u p e r i o rw h e n
the expenditure switching eﬀect is strong.
This result can be understood by considering the impact of exchange rate volatil-
ity and the expenditure switching eﬀect on the three components of the welfare mea-
sure (i.e. the expected levels of consumption and output and the variance of output).
Equations (41) and (40) show that the expected levels of output and consumption in
a ﬂoating rate regime decline as the expenditure switching eﬀect becomes stronger
(at least for high values of θ). The decline in the expected levels of output and con-
sumption is a direct result of the rise in the volatility of output that occurs in the
ﬂoating rate regime as the expenditure switching eﬀect becomes stronger. Higher
output volatility raises the risk premia in goods prices (λPH and λP∗
F) and therefore
lowers work eﬀort and the supply of consumption goods.
In summary, therefore, a strong expenditure switching eﬀect (i.e. a high value
of θ) implies a high variance of output (which has a negative eﬀect on welfare),
a low expected level of output (which has a positive eﬀect on welfare) and a low
expected level of consumption (which has a negative eﬀect on welfare). Furthermore,
a comparison of (25) and (41) shows that the positive welfare eﬀect of the expected
level of output exactly oﬀsets the negative welfare eﬀect of the variance of output.
The net result is that welfare in the ﬂoating rate regime declines as the expenditure
switching eﬀect becomes stronger because of the negative impact of output volatility
on the expected level of consumption. And, for large values of θ, this eﬀect can
become so strong that it implies that a ﬁxed rate regime is welfare superior to a
ﬂoating rate regime.
6 Conclusions
This paper has analysed the implications of the expenditure switching eﬀect for
the choice of exchange rate regime in the presence of foreign monetary shocks. A
comparison between ﬁxed and ﬂoating rate regimes shows that, while the volatility
of consumption is unambiguously lower in the ﬂoating exchange rate regime, the
volatility of home output can be higher or lower depending on the value of the
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. A welfare comparison of
t h et w or e g i m e sc o n c l u d e st h a taﬂoating exchange rate regime yields higher welfare
when the expenditure switching eﬀect is relatively weak, but a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime is superior when the expenditure switching eﬀect is strong.
14It is necessary to conclude with some qualifying remarks. The results presented
above are obviously derived in a restricted model. There are a number of highly
relevant and feasible ways in which the model can be generalised. For instance, the
preference function could be generalised to allow for variable degrees of risk aversion
in consumption and labour supply. Given the trade-oﬀ between consumption and
output volatility which arises when the expenditure switching eﬀect is strong, the
degree of risk aversion in consumption and labour supply will have important impli-
cations for the welfare comparison between regimes. It is also necessary to extend
the analysis to consider other sources of shocks. The shock-absorbing role of ﬂoating
exchange rates in the presence of real demand and supply shocks was an important
element in Friedman’s case for ﬂoating rates (and also in the analysis of Mundell
(1960)). This is not addressed by the above model.
Finally, there is the issue of local currency pricing (or more generally the extent of
exchange rate pass through). Devereux and Engel (2000) argue that local currency
pricing is so prevalent that relative prices are insensitive to exchange rate changes.
This implies that the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is
less relevant than the model of this paper implies. Indeed, when there is full local
currency pricing, the elasticity of substitution becomes irrelevant. However, the as-
sumption of full local currency pricing is an extreme case (just as our assumption
of full producer currency pricing is an extreme case). A full analysis of this issue
requires a more general model, which allows for a partial degree of pass-through (or
partial local currency pricing)10 and which also allows the elasticity of substitution
to diﬀer from unity. It would then be possible to analyse the welfare comparison
between ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange rates against the background of a realistic de-
gree of pass-through coupled with empirically relevant values for the elasticity of
substitution and risk aversion.
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A. Optimal Price Setting














PC(h)=pH (h)y(h)+M0 − M(h) − T + R(h) (45)
y(h)=cH(h)+c
∗







































Y = CH + C
∗
H (49)
Rearranging yields the expression in the main text. The derivation of the ﬁrst-
order condition for the representative foreign producer follows identical steps (and
is omitted).
B. Portfolio Allocation, Asset Prices and Risk Sharing
There are four ﬁrst-order conditions for the choice of asset holdings. After some







































The combination of the private and government budget constraints and the portfolio
payoﬀ functions for each country imply that aggregate home and foreign consump-
tion levels are given by
C = y + ζH (y − qH)+ζF (y
∗ − qF) (52)
11Notice that this ﬁrst-order condition is unaﬀected by the existence of income contingent assets
because the asset returns are assumed to be correlated with aggregate real income. Asset returns





H (y − qH)+ζ
∗
F (y
∗ − qF) (53)



















and C∗ in terms of y and y∗.
Using the solution procedure outlined in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996, pp 302-3)






















and consumption levels in the two countries are given by
C =























w h i c hi se q u a t i o n( 1 6 )i nt h em a i nt e x t .
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